Haciendas, Ranchos and Indian Communities: New Perspectives on the Agrarian Question and Popular Rebellion in Veracruz

HEATHER FOWLER-SALAMINI*

IN RECENT YEARS AN INCREASING number of geographers, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists working on agrarian problems are shifting their focus away from central Mexico, or the altiplano, to the periphery.[1] Antonio Escobar Ohmstede and Ana María Gutiérrez have characterized this development as a new de-centralizing trend in the study of land tenure.[2] This explains in part the growing interest in Veracruz, a state with an enormous range of land tenure patterns. My purpose here is to examine the major studies that have appeared over the past decade on the Veracruz agrarian question in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and show how they link land tenure changes, the Indian question, agrarian unrest, and rural agency to popular rebellion. I situate these studies within five historiographical perspectives: populism, revisionism, neo-populism, neocolonialism, and the *Annales* school. In so doing I wish to highlight several innovative approaches and trends but to also suggest there are still many unanswered questions. The extreme

* Dirigir correspondencia a Departament of History, Bradley University, 501 West Bradley Ave, Peoria, Illinois, e-mail: hfs@bumail.bradley.edu.

[1] I would like to thank Raymond Buve, Michael Ducey, Antonio Escobar Ohmstede, David Skerritt Gardner and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of this article.

[2] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GUTIÉRREZ, 1999, t. II, p. 207. The renewed interest in agrarian questions on the periphery, the emergence of new approaches to the agrarian question, and the enormous improvement in accessibility to archival sources, have contributed to the upsurge in new scholarship. The centralization of the federal government's agrarian reform archives in the Archivo General Agrario (AGA) in Mexico City, the opening of the Archivo General del Estado de Veracruz (AGEV), and the cataloguing of numerous municipal archives in the 1990s have all provided new materials for researchers.

diversity and complexity of the state's topography, climate, demography, ethnicity, economic systems, class structure and patterns of development makes it extremely difficult to make broad generalizations about the state, however this complexity introduces an important new dynamic to the study of the agrarian question.

For a long time, two interpretations of the Mexican Revolution have dominated historiography on the Veracruz agrarian question. The populist perspective identified three principal reasons for the outbreak of multiple peasant revolutions beginning in 1910: the high concentration of land in the hands of a landowning elite, wanton exploitation of the peasantry, and brutal repression of any rural resistance.[3] Populists, such as Frank Tannenbaum and George McBride in the US and the Mexican official historians, argued that class-based exploitation linked to the despoliation of *pueblo* lands was the principal cause for the outbreak of a genuine peasant revolution in 1910. The success of this agrarian revolution, they argued, could be linked to the emergence of powerful, grassroots peasant movements and a progressive revolutionary state. A similar perspective emerged within anthropology, often referred to as *campesinismo*. It emphasized the ability of the peasantry to withstand pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary exploitation due to the strength of communal land tenure patterns.[4]

In the 1970s and 1980s revisionist scholars began to question the populist contention that the successful agrarian revolution of 1910 represented a complete rupture with the Old Regime. They argued instead that the national bourgeoisie had seized control of the revolutionary process and had created an authoritarian postrevolutionary state, which was nothing more nor less than a continuation of the Porfirian regime that had coopted and/or destroyed the popular forces.[5] The revisionists also made important contributions to our knowledge of popular movements through their long-term approach to regionalism, *caciquismo* and

[3] See for example REINA, 1980, pp. 28-30, 358-359; AZAOLA GARRIDO, 1982.

[4] HEWITT DE ALCÁNTARA, 1984, pp. 156-164.

[5] CÓRDOVA, 1977; MEYER, 1977; MEYER, 1973a; WOMACK, 1991; HEWITT DE ALCÁNTARA, 1984, pp. 156-157.

the *ranchero*.[6] In a recent article Emilio Kouri has advanced the revisionist critique one step further by questioning the fundamental populist assumption that the Indian *pueblos* were totally committed to the defense of communal landownership and were therefore opposed to the Liberal policy of the privatization of communal lands.[7]

Three new historiographical approaches have also criticized the populist interpretation and suggested more nuanced ways or entirely new models for examining popular rural unrest. The *Annales* school, neo-populism or post-revisionism, and post-colonialism have all sought to reexamine the agrarian question and the nature of rebellion. In many respects a certain backlash has set in, which has cast doubt on the more simplistic populist and revisionist rhetoric. *Annales* scholars use the *longue durée* approach and/or the history of *mentalités* to reassess socioeconomic and political processes stretching far back into the colonial period. François-Xavier Guerra combines these two perspectives in his brilliant synthesis of quantitative data gathered on thousands of political actors living during the second half of the nieneteenth century and early twentieth centuries. He locates these actors within the historical context of a conflict between two worlds: the traditional "holistic" society and the "modern" society, which upholds the fundamental rights of the citizen. This bipolar model stresses long-term urban political and cultural transformations and downplays local "traditional" and indigenous agrarian patterns and processes. It places greater weight on global modernization and elite mentalities that seek to bring about accommodation and change from the outside.[8] By emphasizing global development patterns, he has raised a new awareness of the interrelationship between rural and urban societies. On the other hand, neo-populists or neo-revisionists have blended together elements of populism and revisionism. Alan Knight has argued that there are three key elements of any revolution: genuine mass participation,

[6] MEYER, 1973b; SCHRYER, 1980. See for example articles by Romana Falcón, Raymond Buve, and Hans Werner Tobler in KATZ (ed.), 1988.

[7] KOURI, 2002.

[8] GUERRA, 1985, t. I, pp. 19-25.

the struggle of rival visions/ideologies, and a consequent, serious battle over political authority. Irrespective of its outcome and function, the Mexican Revolution led to the "ultimate national synthesis" under Venustiano Carranza blending elements of the old regime, middle class reformism and popular movements.[9]

Post-colonialism emerged in the late 1980s based on the writings of Antonio Gramsci, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault. In particular the Subaltern Studies Group sought "to demonstrate how, in the political transformations occurring in colonial and post-colonial Indian society, subalterns not only developed their own strategies of resistance but actually helped define and refine elite options".[10] Following this line of argumentation, U.S. scholars, Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, have applied James C. Scott's concept of "everyday forms of resistance" to Mexican rural movements and have highlighted the different "modes of contestation and structures and discourses of power between the elites and the popular groups".[11] Their emphasis on regionalism has called into question the global *Annalistes* approach. All five of these historiographical currents have found resonance in recent studies of the Veracruz agrarian question.

To provide a simple framework for our short historiographical analysis, we have broken the state of Veracruz down into three territorial divisions the Center, North, and South. This subdivision into three large spatial units is due in part to the state's banana —or sausage— like shape, which makes other divisions more cumbersome. There are obvious drawbacks to this division because the northern and southern regions in many respects share more in common with neighboring states in terms of their geography, economy, ethnicity, and culture. Another problem with this model is that each region has a sub-tropical coastal as well as a sierra subregion, which might make dividing the state into six regions more practical.[12] However, the sierra and coast sub-regions are closely intercon-

[9] KNIGHT, 1985, pp. 6, 9.

[10] MALLON, 1994, p. 1494

[11] SCOTT, 1985; WELLS and JOSEPH, 1996, p. 2.

[12] Carmen Blázquez Domínguez has divided the state into seven regions, primarily based on altitude and climate. BLÁZQUEZ, 2000, pp. 13-18.

nected in terms of property ownership, commerce, political strongmen, and rebel activities. What is more, the Center has some distinctive characteristics that differentiate it from the North and South, and therefore tip the scales in favor of using a strictly territorial division. The Center has a larger population, a higher level of *mestizaje*, different regional economies, more developed communication systems, and a higher level of urbanization and industrialization. The state capital is also located in this region, which is another compelling reason to treat the center separately from the two peripheral regions, which are quite remote from the center of political power.

This essay focuses on what role the agrarian question played in the nineteenth century and how it influenced the 1910 revolts in Veracruz. The first part concentrates on the agrarian problems of the nineteenth century, while the second part focuses on the nature of the 1910 rebellion. Four salient themes emerge in the recent scholarship on nineteenth century Veracruz. First, the breakup of the large estates was linked to three long-term processes: the selling and/or division of haciendas by indebted landowning families, new market forces which demanded more efficient use of resources, and the rise of productive, small and medium-sized *ranchos*. Moreover, in all three regions the Mexican state was not solely responsible for the implementation of the Liberal privatization of land. Local Indian and mestizo farmers and cattle-raisers found alternative ways to confront, circumvent or exploit the state's policies to break up communal holdings for their own personal economic, political, and cultural interests. In other words, they exerted their own form of peasant agency. Third, *rancheros* began to play an increasingly important role in the rural economy, politics and culture, and they saw no reason to question the Porfirian economic policies that had primarily benefited them. Finally, when serious agrarian uprisings did occur in Papantla and Acayucan after the 1880s, they were not simply reactive indigenous responses to the state's ruthless privatization policies. Other concomitant local social, cultural, and political forces were at work that fueled long-term but low-intensity rural discontent. Although these same processes were transforming other regions of Mexico during the same time period, their unique combination at the

regional level meant that they played out in a different manner in Veracruz.

The second part of this article addresses what form popular discontent took in Veracruz after 1910. Four themes surface in the recent literature on the nature of rural unrest. First, the Maderista movement was inspired primarily by political objectives rather than agrarian objectives. What is more, the relative calm in the countryside was partially due to the continuing prosperity in the export agricultural and commercial sectors that provided employment for large numbers of landless rural workers. Third, when this movement did spill over into the countryside, it did not spur a widespread *agrarista* movement. Finally, the *rancheros* emerged as the key players in all three regions during the 1910s. As in other parts of the republic their role was quite complex and ambiguous. While Friedrich Katz, Jane-Dale Lloyd, Frans Schryer, Romana Falcón, and Ian Jacobs have emphasized their revolutionary role in Chihuahua, Hidalgo, San Luis Potosí, and Guerrero, Luis González y González and Raymond Buve among others have shown their passivity or counter-revolutionary stance in Michoacán and Tlaxcala.[13] In Veracruz, *rancheros* were drawn into the rebellion as both revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries.

THE CENTER

The nine cantons[14] which make up this region had extremely diverse land tenure patterns and economies in the nineteenth century due in large part to the presence of the Sierra Madre Oriental running along its western border. Elevations range from the highest peak in Mexico to a sub-tropical coastal plain stretching along the Gulf of Mexico. Most recent work has concentrated on either the temperate highlands or the coastal plain. These studies on the prerevolutionary period have emphasized three themes: the gradual breakup of the hacienda system, the

[13] KATZ, 1998, pp. 17-35, 59; LLOYD, 1987; SCHRYER, 1980; FALCÓN, 1984; JACOBS, 1982. See GONZÁLEZ Y GONZÁLEZ, 1974, and BUVE, 1994.

[14] Misantla, Jalacingo, Xalapa, Coatepec, Huatusco, Veracruz, Orizaba, Córdoba, and Zongolica.

emergence of the rancho as the predominant land tenure unit, and the resistance by villagers in order to subvert Liberal land policies.

Luc Cambrezy and Bernal Lascurain's monumental study of Central Veracruz follows the *Annales* school by relying heavily on statistical data to give us a long-term perspective on the hacienda system. It situates 184 of the state's 355 haciendas in the nine central cantons in the waning years of the Porfiriato. Haciendas were much more dispersed at the far ends of the state. They attribute this spatial distribution to the interdependency between the haciendas and the major cities, which were linked to the major means of communication and major markets. Drawing upon rich data of the Atlas of the Comisión Geográfica Exploradora, they construct a series of maps to situate spatially all these *haciendas*. They discovered that estates were generally clustered in three sub-regions: Xalapa-Perote, Córdoba-Orizaba, and the Sierras of Chiconquiaco and Misantla. The estates located in the Xalapa-Perote region produced coffee, vanilla, tobacco, sugar cane or wheat for the national or international markets. However, their *cascos* (central building complex) quite frequently housed textile factories as well as sugar and/or coffee mills. Cambrezy characterizes these landholdings as small *haciendas*, which were sometimes no more than 200 hectares in size. One of the key spatial elements that distinguished them from the *ranchos* was the quality, quantity, and size of the *cascos*, which depended on the level of capital investment. *Hacienda cascos* were constructed of stone, while the *rancho* buildings were more modest and generally made of wood or *adobe*.[15]

Relying on the data of the Comisión Geográfica, Cambrezy shows how the *haciendas* in the central region were beginning to break up under the pressure of the forces of modernization at the end of the nineteenth century. Landowners went into debt borrowing money to modernize their estates and found themselves forced to sell off portions of their estates due to inefficient farming methods and/or spiraling land costs. This demonstrates, he contends, that:

[15] CAMBREZY and LASCURAIN, 1991, pp. 6-13; GARCÍA MORALES, 1989a, pp. 131-179.

Los estudios sobre la evolución del territorio se resisten a la famosa "periodización", que tanto buscan los historiadores. En la región de Xalapa, coexisten la inercia y el dinamismo, las herencias se entrelazan con las novedades, y resulta demasiado esquemático afirmar que el latifundismo terminó con la Revolución [...] En efecto, siendo la fragmentación de la tenencia un proceso continuo, las rupturas históricas se vuelven borrosas cuando se trata del espacio geográfico.[16]

If the breakup of the hacienda into numerous *ranchos* was already in full swing before 1910 and cannot be directly attributed to the revolutionary process, what were the principal reasons for this major transformation of the land tenure system?

Cambrezy links the financial failure of the less efficient haciendas and the emergence of the *rancho* directly to modernization processes. With the breakup of the haciendas, a new landowning group, the *rancheros*, emerged to fill the spaces left by the *hacendados*. "En varios casos, los herederos de partes de la hacienda inicial; pero en muchos otros, no pertenecían a la oligarquía local sino a una nueva clase acomodada, comerciantes y a veces extranjeros, quienes adquirieron sus tierras mediante procesos de compraventa".[17] David Skerritt Gardner takes this approach one step further by tracing the colonial and nineteenth century roots of *ranchero* society in the coastal municipio of Actopan. He highlights three long-term factors that contributed to the rise of the *ranchero* society: a significant population influx, a Spanish colonial mentality favorable to cattle-raising, and a "pluralistic" economic environment, where land tenure, market forces, and outside entrepreneurs interacted.[18] The landowner's decision to divide Las Tortugas hacienda into nine lots and sell them off in smaller parcels had a far greater impact on the commercialization of rural properties in Actopan and the emergence of a new rural bourgeoisie, he contends, than the Liberal policies privatizing communal lands.[19]

[16] CAMBREZY and LASCURAIN, 1991, pp. 3, 57.

[17] CAMBREZY, 1991, 57-61. See this argument discussed in BAITENMANN, 1998, p. 39; HOFFMANN, 1992, p. 58.

[18] SKERRITT GARDNER, 1993, pp. 11-13.

[19] SKERRITT GARDNER, 1993, pp. 111-129, and SKERRITT GARDNER, 1994.

In neighboring La Antigua, Paso de Ovejas, and Puente Nacional, Skerritt found land tenure patterns followed a similar evolution. Due to the low population density of the region, the *haciendas* more often than not had numerous *ranchos* within their boundaries, where the local *rancheros* or outside administrators would oversee the sharecroppers, tenants and day laborers. He distinguishes these *ranchos* from the small *haciendas*, not so much in terms of the level of capital investment, but in terms of residence patterns. *Rancheros* resided on their holdings and depended almost exclusively on family labor. The *rancho*'s size, usually 200 to 1000 hectares, and their major agricultural activity, cattle-raising, were not dissimilar from the neighboring *haciendas*. However, rancheros relied more heavily on family labor unlike the absentee *hacienda* owners. Moreover, they developed dependent relations with *arrendatarios* (tenant farmers) and the *jornaleros* (day laborers), whom they hired to perform specific tasks. He also links long-term expansion of the *rancho* in central Veracruz to demographic transformations. The migration of landless peasants down from the Sierra del Norte and the arrival of new Spanish immigrants during the second half of the nineteeth century fueled economic development of a once stagnant coastal region.[20]

For Skerritt, the construction of a male *ranchero* mentality is critical in understanding the success of the *ranchero* economy. While González y González considered land ownership a critical element in the Michoacan *ranchero* way of life, Skerritt argues this was not necessarily the case in Veracruz. As long as one had the desire, a certain predisposition, to gain access or ownership to land as a tenant farmer, a collective landowner, etc., a person could be characterized as a *ranchero*. Another important element of the *ranchero* mentality was his independence and his ability to defend that condition through his control over his family, his land, rural labor, and his self-image.[21] He worked ardently to cultivate a particular

[20] SKERRITT GARDNER, 1989, pp. 80-84; HOFFMANN and SKERRITT GARDNER, 1992; VELAZQUEZ, 1995. See also Esteban Barragán's discussion of the expansion of the Mexican sierra *ranchero* society in BARRAGAN, 1990, pp. 102-104.

[21] SKERRITT GARDNER, 1989, pp. 21-22.

public image of a man, whose word counts and who earns his living from cattleraising. Besides controlling the social and economic affairs of the family, he had to make sure he dominated male-female relationships. As the male head of household, he promoted "*macho*" values and the singular importance of producing male offspring to supply family labor and to pass his property on to.[22] Skerritt's case studies of the "*ranchero acomodado*" are particularly valuable, for he demonstrates how in a relatively short period of time a number of *ranchero* families gained access to large quantities of money during the final decades of the Porfiriato. What is central to his argument is the development of what the *Annalistes* have called the "modern" mentality, that is to say, the *rancheros* were willing to take risks by borrowing money for entrepreneurial purposes, much in the same way as *hacienda* owners had done before them. This mentality prepared them to play a defining role in trying to safeguard their newly acquired wealth, as the *rancheros* of Pisaflores, Hidalgo, when popular discontent began to spread out into the region in the 1910s.[23]

In the highland central region of Veracruz, the gradual breakup of the *hacienda* system as well as the privatization of the communal properties also led to the proliferation of *ranchos*. In Córdoba's fertile subtropical lands, outside entrepreneurs began developing modern, medium-sized, sugar/coffee haciendas in the 1870s and 1880s oriented towards the external market. In her fine study of the evolution of the Córdoba land tenure system, Mabel Rodríguez Centeno agrees with Cambrezy that the intensification of crop production for the export market and the growth of indebtedness were two important changes which transformed the nature of the Porfirian *hacienda*. As a consequence of these changes, landowners could only afford to own small to medium-sized *haciendas*, for they were forced to borrow larger and larger amounts of capital to produce and process a premium grade of coffee. When the communal properties were first privatized in the mid-1800s, local landowners were the major beneficiaries. However, when the world price of coffee reached new highs in the 1890s,

[22] SKERRITT GARDNER, 1993, p. 172.

[23] SKERRITT GARDNER, 1993, pp. 145-157; SCHRYER, 1980, pp. 69-84.

fifteen outside entrepreneurs came into the region and gradually bought up a major portion of the coffee-producing, former communal properties. These trends were symptomatic of the decline of the *hacienda* and communal systems occurring throughout the entire coffee-producing belt stretching from Córdoba north to Jalapa. In Xico the buyers of former communal lands, says Odile Hoffmann, were also primarily local *rancheros* of Spanish descendent or outside agricultural entrepreneurs from Puebla and Mexico. At the same time, these medium-sized, coffee *fincas* were emerging, another trend was developing. Rapid fragmentation of smaller holdings was occurring as population pressures mounted, forcing freeholders to divide up or sell off their holdings into *minifundia*.[24]

What is more ambiguous is whether the state and municipal authorities played a major role in the breakup of these communal lands in the central highland region. The State's Liberal project to divide up communal landholdings appears on the surface to have been quite successful. The community of Chiltoyac lost its communal lands early on and survived by providing laborers to neighboring *haciendas*. In Huatusco, communities were leasing large portions of their municipal lands in the mid-nineteenth century in perpetuity to small farmers. While most of the rural population lived in small *rancherías* (small settlements on *ranchos*) inside the *haciendas*, many *pueblos* remained outside their boundaries.[25] However, mounting evidence suggests that the state was having considerable difficulty in dividing up the communal lands in all parts of the state. In his 1896 bi-annual report, Governor Teodoro Dehesa spoke of the obstacles confronting his administration. Tenacious indigenous resistance to the privatization of communal properties and municipal lands had resulted in public disturbances and a delay in the successful completion of the program.[26] He laid the blame squarely on the obstructionist

[24] RODRÍGUEZ CENTENO, 1997, pp. 136-137, 145-147, 155-166. See also FOWLER-SALAMINI, 1994, p. 58, and HOFFMANN, 1992, pp. 104-107.

[25] SARTORIUS, 1870, p. 165; HOFFMANN, 1992, pp. 112-113; BAITENMANN, 1998, p. 39.

[26] "Informe de 1896", in Carmen Blázquez Domínguez (coord.), *El Estado de Veracruz: Informes de sus gobernadores, 1826-1988*, t. IX, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, Xalapa, 1986, p. 4653. Cited in SKERRITT GARDNER, 1996, chap. 1.

indigenous population. However, new studies influenced by the post-colonialist concern for peasant negotiation with the state paint a far more complex picture of the Liberal project as well as of peasant agency.

In the Chiconquiaco Sierra northwest of Xalapa as well as in the upper valley of Orizaba, Raymond Craib documents how Liberal privatization policies led to continual conflicts between the state authorities and the communities because they had constructed different visions of whom should have access to the land. Drawing upon the works of James Ferguson, and James C. Scott, he argues that the Porfirian state hoped to simplify, rationalize and bureaucratize land tenure and agrarian practices to reflect its own normative vision based on a "market and bureaucratic logic". The division of communal lands can best be understood as both a "metaphorical and literal 'state fixation': an obsession with land privatization based upon classical liberal economic assumptions and a recognition of the concomitant need to codify the landscape as a permanent, mapped and fixed entity". This vision also reflects the State's ethnic and elitist stereotypical views of indigenous peoples in particular and villagers in general. Its discourse also conflated indigenousness with antiliberalism and presumed that indigenous villages were by their very nature resistant to anything related to land division.[27]

The Liberal state was however unable to implement its policies due to the lack of cadastral surveys, insufficient financial resources, vagueness in the implementation provisions, and lack of qualified surveyors, Craib argues. By placing the responsibility for the implementation of the surveying of land and its subsequent division into the hands of municipal authorities, the state was in effect relinquishing its control over the process. As a consequence, the land division process at the local level "was a negotiated and contested process, one of tactical give and take between a wide-range of actors: municipal authorities, indigenous leaders, regional state officials, and the surveyors themselves".[28] The state's resolve to end old land disputes by fixing boundaries and dividing up

[27] CRAIB, 2001, pp. 73, 118, 164; CRAIB, 2002, p. 68.

[28] CRAIB, 2001, p. 151.

communal lands, in some cases led to the emergence of even worse land conflicts. For example, in the longstanding dispute between Tonayán and Chapultepec over Las Chivas hill, the community authorities used creative ways to undercut the validity of the State's maps and surveys. Tonayán authorities exploited in a modern form "the colonial dictum 'obedezco pero no cumplo,' of maintaining traditional practices under a veneer of new dictates". When the land was finally parceled, certain individuals, usually *rancheros*, within or from outside the communities benefited more than others.[29] Although the precise role played by local authorities in the land parcelization process is not always clear, land division and border questions, Craib contends, were more closely related to internal community politics and clientelism than to State policies.

Craib documents how community distrust of the Porfirian land policies led local individuals to subvert the privatization process for their own benefit. For example, the villagers considered the *rifa* or *sorteo*, a lottery system designed to assign parcels through random drawing, as unjust. They resisted the arbitrary assignment of parcels without consideration to what they had originally possessed or traditionally farmed across the state.[30] In Acultzingo, Orizaba, the villagers took control of the parcelization process themselves. Once surveyed, the former communal plots somehow entered into market circulation. In the midst of economic recession, a virtual frenzy of land transactions took place between 1902 and 1908. By 1918 twelve individuals owned one third of the *temporal* and a quarter of the *monte* lands of the original communal holdings.[31]

In short, these pioneering studies on central Veracruz demonstrate the very complexity of the agrarian question leading up to the Revolution, where multiple actors were negotiating for greater access to land and water resources. The gradual increase in the number of small —and medium— sized property owners as the *hacienda* system began to crumble

[29] CRAIB, 2001, pp. 85, 87, 164-166. See also Ducey's case study on Naolinco in DUCEY, 2002, pp. 114-115.

[30] CRAIB, 2001, pp. 159-161.

[31] CRAIB, 2001, Tables 3.2 and 3.3, p. 166.

ensured the dispersion rather than the concentration of rural wealth in the highlands and along the coast. While indigenous communities in the highland region were increasingly being forced to lease or sell their communal properties, they were very often able to have it accomplished more or less on their own terms. Thus the Center was not a region wracked by economic impoverishment, starvation, and high levels of tension between landlord and peasant. Land tenure problems were not sufficiently flagrant to create the conditions for serious local popular unrest by the end of the Porfiriato. Other factors linked to regional and state political, social, and cultural grievances would have to surface before agrarian unrest would erupt.[32]

THE NORTH

The five former cantons that made up the North were quite marginalized from Veracruz's overall political and economic development until the twentieth century because no roads or railroads connected the region directly to the port of Veracruz. The North was more closely tied to the Huasteca region and its river systems, which were linked to the ports of Tampico and Tuxpan. While the cantons of Chicontepec and Papantla are quite distinct in terms of their geography and agriculture, they shared two characteristics in common: a predominantly indigenous population and a high level of communal landholding that had been hotly contested for centuries. On their small subsistence plots, Indians cultivated coffee, vanilla, and sugar side by side the staple crops of corn and beans. The other three cantons, Tuxpan, Tantoyuca, and Ozuluama, lay on the subtropical coastal plain, where the population was less dense and more dispersed. Many *mestizo* entrepreneurs and merchants moved into the region from the two nearby commercial centers, Tampico and Tuxpan.

[32] Ricardo Rendón Garcini makes the same argument for Tlaxcala at the end of the Porfiriato. Although land values had increased and the circulation of properties had risen, this had not led to an overconcentration of land in the hands of a few landowners. A large number of small and medium freeholders had emerged. Political, social, and economic discontent and the arrival of non-peasant elements from outside Tlaxcala had to appear before popular rebellion could develop. RENDÓN GARCINI, 1993, p. 132.

Large cattle ranches with rather fluid boundaries dotted the landscape in the nineteenth century until oil was discovered in 1901. With the arrival of foreign oil companies, land values skyrocketed and a myriad of land conflicts surfaced in the final years of the Porfiriato.

Recent scholarship on the North rejects the populist studies of Frank Tannenbaum, George McBride, Victoria Chenaut, and José Velasco Toro, which emphasized the proletarianization of the Indian villages as a consequence of the Liberal privatization of communal lands. It rejects the characterization of the Indian pueblos as homogeneous, egalitarian communities, which used collective decision-making processes, to resist the Liberal project.[33] Influenced by Guy Thomson's and Florencia Mallon's work on peasant agency and popular liberalism in the Sierra Norte of Puebla, they emphasize the democratic and communal as opposed to the individualistic, capitalistic, and hierarchical dimensions of liberalism. Peasants could more easily embrace this variant of liberalism, they argue.[34] At the same time, they recognize that the seeds of popular rebellion are not entirely homegrown, for the economic impact of global markets also begins to affect the region.

These pioneering studies reexamine nineteenth century agrarian law to understand why the *condueñazgo* or *grandes lotes* (private property owned by shareholders) became a mechanism employed by Huasteca communities to give them greater agency and control over their communal lands. This approach tends to dramatize the Indians' heroic and creative struggle to defend their communal lands against the Liberal project. They contend that the transition from communal landholding to private landholding was a long-term process, which manifested itself in many different scenarios at the local level. Michael Ducey explains how communities manipulated the Liberal project over the course of the nineteenth century to retain as much of their communal holdings as possible. The state law of 1826, he argues, actually had more impact on communal landholding

[33] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GORDILLO, 1998, p. 208; DUCEY, 2002, pp. 111-112; KOURI, 1996, chap. 4. See also CHENAUT, 1996, and VELASCO TORO, 1979.

[34] DUCEY, 1997, p. 66; THOMSON, 1991, pp. 208-209; MALLON, 1995.

in the North than the Ley Lerdo. It called for the division of all communal village properties that had been acquired through colonial titles or bought as private property to be distributed among the Indian *comuneros*. Since the state did not have enough enforcement power to implement this law in the remote Huasteca, Indian communities took advantage of this power vacuum to protect and augment their properties by launching legal challenges to the division of communal properties, buying up adjacent private lands, creating *condueñazgos*, and instituting land invasions. These Indian families had a strong sense of usufruct rights, and fought fiercely to maintain control over their specific family plots. Ducey reminds us that municipal officials often ignored the land laws or applied them to suit villagers' interests. In this manner villages were able to "preserve and expand community holdings" before 1870 when there was little encroachment on peasant lands.[35]

Antonio Escobar Ohmstede and Jaqueline Gordillo also concentrate on the issue of peasant/Indian agency in their research on nineteenth century Huasteca. They attack the *decampesinista* argument, which contends that the break up of communal landholdings led to impoverishment of the Indians and violent class-based responses. Instead, they contend that the Indians chose a number of options, some of which were non-violent which obliged the state and federal governments to modify their positions. Escobar and Gordillo stress how Indian "communal" space was expanded through the purchasing of *hacienda* lands, litigation to augment holdings, and land invasions in Tantoyuca and Temapache. By employing the concept "*hacienda/condueñazgo*", they draw attention to the fluidity of landownership and land usage. In other words, Indians had access to and farmed simultaneously private property, communal ejidal land, and *fundos legales*. Through the *condueñazgo*, they even legally recreated communal organizations in some places where no colonial settlements had previously existed.[36] When the state legislature finally realized it did not have sufficient power to enforce the Ley Lerdo, it passed a transitional measure in

[35] DUCEY, 1997, pp. 67-71, 76, 77-78, 80.

[36] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GORDILLO, 1998, pp. 17, 32, 36.

1874 that gave *ayuntamientos* the power to divide communal land into large lots or *condueñazgos* rather than individual parcels. In short, Escobar and Gordillo concur with Ducey that Veracruz agrarian legislation provided certain legal mechanisms for villagers and local authorities to defend temporarily their communal landholdings. It is not coincidental that the height of the *condueñazgo* was precisely when Porfirian efforts to divide up communal lands were most vigorous. It was "[...] *una alternativa de defensa territorial que los grupos tanto indios como no indios usaron en un momento conyuntural de transformación social*".[37]

While Ducey, Escobar, and Gordillo give greater agency to indigenous communities, they downplay as many other scholars the role of state and federal governments in the privatization process. They highlight the disparity between the Liberal state's sweeping objectives and its ability to implement this policy. Ducey argues that "peasants manipulated the state to ensure their own survival even in the difficult times of the Porfiriato" by re-negotiating local power relations and reshaping the Liberal project. Ultimately, local political factors rather than outside economic factors or the Liberal laws were the primary reason for the loss of communal lands. *Comuneros* were just unable to cope with the machinations of *jefes políticos* and municipal authorities. It was the villagers' declining political weight under the modernizing regime of Porfirio Díaz rather than the state policies themselves which ultimately led to the demise of their local autonomy.[38]

If the privatization process was much more complex and convoluted than originally elaborated by official Mexican historiography, who were the chief beneficiaries? According to Ducey insiders and outsiders, who were not only Indian elites but also *mestizo* and foreign-born farmers, inserted themselves into the process through manipulation of their family ties and acquired former communal lands.[39] Escobar and Gutiérrez concur. In practice, some community members were more equal than others.

[37] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GORDILLO, 1998, pp. 20-24, 34-39.

[38] DUCEY, 1997, pp. 66, 82, 84-85.

[39] DUCEY, 1997, p. 83; ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GUTIÉRREZ, 1999, p. 209.

"*Los jefes políticos y los ayuntamientos intentaron llevar con eficacia las leyes de división de tierras comunales, quizá no totalmente con el espíritu modernizador sino más bien con el de enriquecimiento propio*".[40] To prevent the loss of communal farming and pastoral resources the Chicontepec *ayuntamiento* on its own initiative divided up its 29 900 hectares into 11 *condueñazgos* in 1885 with each family receiving at least 4 hectares. Since some beneficiaries lived on outlying ranchos and did not occupy their parcels immediately, certain entrepreneurial individuals exploited this opportunity to gain access to these properties. Political functionaries, merchants, and interpreters bought these lots and converted them into 500 to 2 000-hectare ranchos or haciendas. Meanwhile, the Indians who had sold their shares, were reduced to *colonos* or day laborers on the very properties that they had once farmed as free peasants.[41]

New studies on the Papantla region, the center of vanilla production, even clash more openly with the populist and *campesinista* interpretation of the Totonac rebellions of the 1880s and 90s. In her earlier work Victoria Chenaut had used a class analysis, which emphasized defense of the communal lands, to explain the rebellions' origin. She linked the rebellions specifically to the indigenous people's desire to preserve and reproduce their ethnic identity. Her *campesinista* perspective led her to place most of the blame for the revolt on the State, although she does show how the intrusion of merchant class, high local taxes, and the low vanilla prices contributed to the outbreak of rebellion. In a recent article, Chenaut explores not only the state's agrarian legislation but also its political discourse. She skillfully constructs the Porfirian regime's mentality and its efforts to legitimize the consolidation of a juridical order based on modernization. Her argument bears some resemblance to Craib's discussion of the Porfirian state's fixation with positivist modernity. To delegitimize the Totonac rebellions, the official discourse represented the Totonac community as a social group incapable of making its own deci-

[40] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GUTIÉRREZ, 1999, p. 42.

[41] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GUTIÉRREZ, 1999, pp. 218-221, 239. They found similar land tenure patterns and labor systems in the neighboring municipalities of Huayacocutla, Zontecomatlán, Ixhuatlán de Madero, Texcatepec, and Tlachichilco.

sions. It likewise constructed a bi-polar model to justify its repression of the revolts that was based on "*la lucha del civilizado contra el salvaje*".[42] In short, she views the Totonacs as the unfortunate victims of the state's cultural and political oppression.

Approaching Indian rebellion from the perspective of the global market economy, Emilio Kouri downplays Chenaut's argument that *pueblo* inhabitants or community members were opposed to the privatization of communal lands. He does not accept the view that this "professed resistance to any change in the system of landownership inevitably took on an overtly ethnic character" in defense of the community.[43] He places more emphasis on capitalist forces or what he terms the "business of land", which had penetrated the very fabric of Papantla society by this time. That is to say, the international market directly influenced the actions of the Papantla commercial elite. Indian and non-Indian elites alike manipulated the very malleable *condueñazgo*, so as to monopolize vertically the regional production and marketing of vanilla. In his critique of Chenaut's interpretation, Kouri argues that the privatization process had more sweeping economic implications than ethnic and political ones. To his mind, privatization of communal lands is tied more directly to local commercial conflicts, although serious demographic pressures and state fiscal needs also aggravated them.

> Perhaps nowhere in Veracruz was the division of communal lands more openly conflictive than in the pueblo of Papantla. Here a rapacious entrepreneurial class (which included Indians) and strong but deeply divided groups of Totonac farmers fought with each other and among themselves, not so much over whether the land should be privatized, but over how it would be divided and who would get to own it.[44]

One of the most interesting parts of Kouri's analysis is his discussion of the manipulation of the *condueñazgo* by communal leaders. The *juntas de indígenas* were assigned by the law of 1874 the right to govern these new

[42] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GUTIÉRREZ, 1999, p. 98.

[43] KOURI, 2002, p. 75.

[44] KOURI, forthcoming.

entities and implement the privatization process rather than the *ayuntamientos*, which allowed greater manipulation within individual communities. In Papantla the three Totonac notables, who were appointed by the *ayuntamiento* to oversee the *condueñazgo*, were popular community leaders and they had actively participated in the Liberal insurgency. They had also developed economic interests transcending traditional Totonac society, and therefore they were able to control access to *condueñazgo* land. The notables promoted their own private economic interests rather than the communal goals. Furthermore, Kouri maintains, these notables collaborated with local non-Indians and foreign immigrants from the outside. Thus, the creation of the *condueñazgo* was therefore a carefully constructed strategy developed by individual Indian and non-Indian *rancheros* to control land access and ownership.[45] By the same token, the decision to proceed with the *reparto* of the *condueñazgos*, after the issuance of the 1889 state law, had to have come from within the region. Wealthier *condueños*, the *rancheros* and the town merchants became convinced that the partition of the lots was the best course to follow to safeguard their own individual interests even if it meant armed revolt. The real victor was therefore not the Porfirian state, but the town vanilla merchants who "reigned supreme".[46] These findings tend to dispute the importance of peasant agency within the Totonac communities, which Ducey, Escobar, Gutiérrez, and Gordillo have emphasized in the Huasteca.

Although these new studies on the Huasteca have approached the privatization process from neo-populist and revisionist perspectives, they attack the traditional populist approach to rural rebellion and stress the emergence of local peasant and *ranchero* resistance to and manipulation of the state's Liberal land policies. In so doing, they concur with Friedrich Katz and Frans Schryer, among others, who have demonstrated that one of the most significant outcomes of the Porfirian privatization of communal landholdings was the emergence of a rural middle sector.[47]

[45] KOURI, forthcoming.

[46] KOURI, forthcoming.

[47] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GORDILLO, 1998, p. 43.

What is in much greater dispute is the impact of the global economy on long-term changes in land tenure and on popular rebellion.

THE SOUTH

The South was composed of four cantons on the eve of the twentieth century: Los Tuxtlas, Acayucan, Cosamaloapan, and Minatitlán. Except for the Sierra de Los Tuxtlas, the region can be characterized as a vast sub-tropical plain. Its river and railroad systems were much more closely tied to the Papaloapan River basin and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec than to Central Veracruz. This geographic isolation only began to diminish when the Ferrocarril Veracruz al Istmo built a link between the Tehuantepec and the National railroad lines at the turn of the century. Two themes seem to dominate studies on pre-revolutionary southern Veracruz: the expansion of large landholdings for export crop production and mineral resources at the expense of communal properties and *ranchos*, and the famous 1906 revolt.

The populists believed these two themes were intertwined. The Indian ex-*comuneros* of Acayucan were the victims of the Porfirian land policies which sought to stimulate commercial use of private properties. They facilitated the expansion of the plantation system and the rapacious purchase of oil-rich lands by foreign oil companies. For the populists, the 1906 agrarian revolt was first and foremost another peasant revolt against the landowning class that had perpetrated these economic injustices. They also considered it a precursory movement to the Revolution of 1910, for it was the first clear example of sustained violence by the lower and middle groups against the upper class. Elena Azaola Garrido's classic study of the Acayucan revolt focused on the alliance forged between urban middle class elements, affiliated with the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM) and the peasantry.[48] Following Veracruz official historians, David Ramírez Lavoignet, Leonardo Pasquel and Donato Padua, she systemati-

[48] PADUA, 1936; AGETRO, 1942, pp. 29-38; TRENS, 1988, t. II; PASQUEL, 1971, t. I, pp. 85-87; AZAOLA GARRIDO, 1982, pp. 17, 153; COCKCROFT, 1968, pp. 148, 154-156.

cally explored the century-long expansion of the Cházaro Soler and Romero Rubio *haciendas* in collusion with the Porfirian state at the expense of Indian communal holdings. She coupled this story of rapacious land aggrandizement with the long-term struggle of the Popoluca and Nahua Indians to regain their communal lands in Acayucan.[49] As other populists, Azaola Garrido highlighted the direct link between the dispossessed *comuneros* and the PLM organizers, most particularly the Orizaba textile worker, Hilario C. Salas.

While populists tend to stress the economic underpinnings of the Acayucan revolt, revisionists give added emphasis to its political roots, namely the extremely autocratic nature of the Porfirian state. Karl Koth has uncovered new evidence to suggest that the President Díaz was personally meddling in the Acayucan region and directly contributed to the outbreak of the revolt and the ensuing social unrest. Acayucan's *jefe político*, the mayor of Soteapan, and other canton officials were themselves cattle thieves or protectors of cattle rustlers, who mercilessly exploited the Indians. For this reason Governor Dehesa held these local authorities personally accountable for the 1906 revolt. Koth lays the blame squarely on the shoulders of the president himself for perpetuating a corrupt, intrusive political system by imposing from Mexico City one corrupt *jefe político* after another over the objections of Governor Dehesa. Díaz was simply unable to grasp, argues Koth, the significance of the high level of peasant discontent and the amount of grassroots support the PLM had within the region.[50] Although Azaola and Koth uncover new documentary information to support their arguments, they both overemphasize the class-based issues and therefore neglect the fundamental socioeconomic transformations occurring in the region at the turn of the century.

Three other studies distance themselves from the populist and revisionist class analyses to situate the revolt of 1906 within a broader perspective,

[49] AZAOLA GARRIDO, 1982, pp. 11-12, 78-116. See Emilia H. Velázquez's discussion of the cases in which Indians created *condueñazgos* in the Sierra Santa María to maintain control of their communal lands. VELÁZQUEZ, 1992, pp. 251-256.

[50] KOTH, 2002, pp. 42-55.

where long-term modernization processes played a decisive role. Renée González de la Lama employs new social movement theory and spatial theory to examine the emergence of local and regional social protest movements in the South and the North during the Porfiriato. She argues that low intensity banditry was more prevalent in the Center, while widespread rural rebellion was more pervasive in the peripheral regions. Downplaying the role of land disputes and caste conflicts, she argues that Totonac and Populuca resistance to the modernization processes was the decisive factor leading to rural peasant revolts. The imposition of civil matrimony, prohibition of religious festivals, breaking up of communal lands, centralization of political power with the elimination of municipal elections after 1873, compulsory primary education, taxation, and railroad development all contributed to pre-revolutionary rural revolts. Whether these revolts originated in Indian or *mestizo* villages, González de la Lama contends, they all shared three characteristics in common: resistance to modernization policies, a weak alliance between lower and middle-class sectors, and the absence of the strong caudillo leadership, so typical of earlier nineteenth century Mexican revolts.[51]

On the other hand the *Annales* analyses of the 1906 revolt have emphasized how modernization processes acted positively rather than negatively to encourage the emergence of new, forward-looking, middle-class political forces intent on overthrowing Diaz. François-Xavier Guerra contends that the PLM revolts that broke out from Cananea down through the Valley of Orizaba to the Acayucan-Minitatlán region were all located in regions undergoing rapid modernization and immigration. They were "regiones de individuos móviles más que de comunidades agrarias arraigadas en un pasado lejano". Thus the PLM movement and its urban and agrarian-directed rebellions were symptomatic of an ideologically coherent movement that wanted to replace traditional patterns with a modern economy.[52] The French geographer, Marie France Prevôt-Shapira, takes this interpretation one step further by sustaining that the

[51] GONZÁLEZ DE LA LAMA, 1990a, pp. 209-227; GONZÁLEZ DE LA LAMA, 1990b, pp. 53-70.

[52] GUERRA, 1985, t. II, p. 49.

PLM found political support for its message among the urban sectors of Minatitlán. It was the semi-middle class, that is, the railroad workers of the Isthmus, merchants, artisans, and teachers, who molded a modern political life and organized the Liberal Clubs in Chinameca and Puerto México (Coatzacoalcos). The last Magonist rebellion in Acayucan, she argues, only occurred when a new alliance was forged between rural and urban groups in a fractionalized society undergoing forced modernization. The Liberal clubs could link the urban modern enclaves that were freed from the traditional "*sociabilidades*" and the *caciquismo* to other zones of modernity. Although the rural communities were concerned with despoilment of their lands, according Guerra and Prevôt-Shapira they were the *only* group still concerned with territorial questions.[53]

There are still a number of questions about the revolt of 1906 that remain unanswered. For example, it is misleading to suggest that the Liberal policies promoting private property were the only reason for the social unrest in the region. Both Azaola and José Velasco Toro have argued quite rightly that the Acayucan and Papaloapan communal lands had been targeted by the landowning, commercial, and political elites since in the second half of the Porfiriato.[54] However, these authors fail to give enough weight to non-agrarian issues as causes of agrarian unrest. To attribute agrarian revolt simply to a class struggle between the indigenous peoples and the economic and political elites for control over communal lands seems too simplistic. While the populists concentrate primarily on the agrarian problems, Guerra and Prevôt-Shapira have focused almost exclusively on urban discontent. For them, the agrarian question does not seem to be germane at all! However, socioeconomic conditions in the predominantly agricultural cantons of Acayucan and Cosamaloapan should not be easily conflated with those of the heavily urbanized Minatitlán-Coatzacoalcos region. Other local political and social factors must be taken into account to explain the emergence of rural discontent.

[53] PREVÔT SCHAPIRA, 1994, pp. 275-276.

[54] AZAOLA GARRIDO, 1982, pp. 73-81; VELASCO TORO, 2001; VELASCO TORO, 2003, pp. 318-352.

How did outside middle-class PLM organizers really motivate these impoverished, downtrodden Indians to rebel? The actual goals of the PLM Junta in exile were somewhat hazy. They had called for an armed rebellion against the dictatorship in September 1906 and social and political improvements, but their plan laid out no specific remedies for resolving the complex agrarian question. What did Hilario Salas and other PLM organizers offer to the native population to convince them to take up arms and begin to attack the municipal authorities? Dissatisfaction with local authorities and threats to local autonomy might explain why 400 *machete*-wielding Populucas were willing to follow a former Oaxaca textile worker, Hilario Salas, in his attack on Acayucan. However, the causes of the revolt still need to be uncovered.

The long-term significance of the 1906 revolt seems to lie not so much in the rebels' tenuous links to the PLM movement but what Heather Fowler-Salamini has called popular resistance to local authority,[55] which continued long after the revolt. In other words, low-level unrest spilled over into a large part of the south and even crossed over into Tabasco. A ripple effect took place inspired by the 1906 revolt, as popular resistance against local political authorities spread as a contagion to small villages and hamlets throughout the region. As Azaola Garrido emphasizes: "*No había muncipio o pueblo en la región que no contara con un grupo o 'correligionario' —como entre ellos se denominaban— o 'revoltosos' —como eran conocidos por las autoridades—* [...]"[56] Local residents took affairs into their own hands to protest the oppression of local authorities, *caciques*, and desperate socioeconomic conditions. In many municipalities surrounding Acayucan, local authorities in late September abandoned their offices peacefully to the rebels rather than stand and fight. The rebellion was not extinguished immediately, for Soteapan rebels led by a schoolteacher were still fighting a last ditch effort against federal forces on October 3rd. The tax collectors were thrown out of their offices and their

[55] FOWLER SALAMINI, 1993, pp. 105-106. See Gilbert M. Joseph's treatment of the native resistance to the tyranny of the local authorities before 1909 in Yucatán, JOSEPH, 1996, p. 181.

[56] AZAOLA GARRIDO, 1982, pp. 151-160.

books were stolen. Ex-peons of the Franyutti hacienda had demanded lands, but they were ruthlessly suppressed. The rural unrest then spread further inland to the municipalities of Nopalapam, Tesechoacan and Playa Vicente. The participation of the well-off *rancheros* Miguel Alemán and Manuel Turrent suggests that these protest movements were multi-class as well as multi-ethnic,[57] but we really know very little about their motivations for joining this revolt. Thus we need more investigation into the links between agrarian conflict and resentment to local authority domination and malfeasance. Koth gives us some clues, but he lacks the grassroots information needed to understand the articulation between the indigenous and local authorities. Finally, we must explore the inability of the Porfirian federal and state forces to quell these violent local outbursts against the political and economic elite.

What is clear, however, is that the long tradition of popular revolt was concentrated in the North as well as the South in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was closely associated with the conflict between the winners and losers in the parcelization of communal lands as well as new political and economic modernizing forces penetrating these two peripheral regions. Nowhere in the Center did an armed uprising similar to the Papantla or Acayucan revolts erupt before or for that matter during the 1910 Revolution. How can we account for these agrarian rebellions only on the peripheries of the state? The Center had a higher level of integration between rural and urban economies, a more homogenous population, fewer long-standing communal conflicts, an emerging prosperous ranchero society, and the proximity of the state capital, which signified a larger military presence in the countryside. This is why González de la Lama and Heather Fowler-Salamini have argued that rural discontent tended to manifest itself more as a form of social banditry in the Center than on the peripheries.[58]

[57] FOWLER-SALAMINI, 1993, pp. 105-106; GONZÁLEZ DE LA LAMA, 1990a, p. 228; AGUIRRE TINOCO, 1988, pp. 9-10.

[58] GONZÁLEZ DE LA LAMA, 1990b, pp. 53-70; FOWLER-SALAMINI, 1993, p. 106.

POPULAR REBELLION

Agrarian issues played a relatively minor role in the outbreak of armed rebellion in 1910. The breakdown of political legitimacy and authority had to precede the emergence of rural unrest in Veracruz, as in other parts of the republic. Unfortunately no definitive study exists on Maderismo in Veracruz, so we will piece together evidence from the sources available.

Members of the urban middle classes rather than rural leaders seized the initiative to lead the Anti-Reelectionist movement in 1910. Cándido Aguilar, who was the administrator of his uncle's *rancho*, was the exception to the rule. When Francisco I. Madero traveled to the state to campaign for the presidency, he concentrated his attention on the port of Veracruz and the Orizaba Valley, where textile workers had rioted in 1906 and where the middle-class Anti-Reelectionist Clubs were particularly strong. This might explain in part why Aguilar's Plan de San Ricardo, issued near Córdoba on July 14, 1910, called for a revolt in favor of the constitutionally elected Madero and against the assassin and dictator, President Díaz, but it did not mention the question of land reform. It is important to note however, that a number of prominent *rancheros*, including the Gabay brothers, Miguel Aguilar, and Miguel Alemán, participated in Aguilar's call to arms. Although Aguilar and his co-conspirators reportedly with some 100 peons engaged the federal forces en route to Córdoba, he was forced to withdraw and leave the state.[59]

The debate over the relative success of the Veracruz Maderista rebellion centers on the nature of the movement itself. Skerritt argues that Maderismo did not have a large impact on the countryside because it did not offer an agrarian reform program similar to the Zapatista model.[60] Karl Koth counters this view by arguing that there had been continuous peasant and working class resistance since before the 1906

[59] CORZO *et al.*, 1986, pp. 18-21. Camerino Z. Mendoza, Heriberto Jara Corona, Gabriel Gavira, and Rafael Tapia all came from urban artisan backgrounds.

[60] SKERRITT GARDNER, 1993, p. 68, and SKERRITT GARDNER, 1989, pp. 155-158.

rebellion. Peasants, Indians, industrial workers as well as local elites participated in the Maderista rebellion, which contributed to the capture of many key Veracruz towns even before the battle of Ciudad Juárez. In his detailed account of the Maderista rebellion from November 20, 1910 until May of the following year he elaborates on the incessant, surprise attacks launched on police stations, railroad stations, municipal buildings, and troop barracks in highland central Veracruz. These *guerrillas* so effectively harassed the federal troops, he contends, that the military authorities could never re-deploy their troops in Veracruz to Ciudad Juárez.[61] By placing Maderismo within the framework of a broad, populist class-based rebellion, he conflates the rural and urban lower classes with their middle class allies. He is correct that the Maderista groups had seized control over most of the major towns of the Center by the end of May. However, as Heather Fowler-Salamini has shown the Maderista leaders, including Gabriel Gavira, Primo Tapia, Heriberto Jara, and Garrido Huerta, were disgruntled members of the urban middle class, who were far more interested in political change than sweeping agrarian reform. They fashioned instead a working alliance with *ranchero* groups but not with the peasantry or Orizaba textile workers. This motley band of rebels was held together by its dislike of the Porfirian regime rather than an agenda for sweeping socioeconomic change. A contemporary account of the entrance of the Maderistas into Jalapa on June 5th lends credence to this interpretation. They were described as 800 poorly mounted and badly armed *rancheros* who straggled into the state capital.[62] What still is unclear is why these *rancheros* joined the Maderista movement in the first place.

Koth would agree with Knight that Veracruz can possibly be counted along with Chihuahua, Durango, Morelos, and Puebla as a state where outbursts of rural discontent led to sweeping changes in local government in the spring of 1911. "Grievances against local officials, especially *jefes políticos*, were probably the most common determinants of revolu-

[61] KOTH, 2002, pp. VIII-IX, 98-112.

[62] FOWLER-SALAMINI, 1993, pp. 107-109. Rafael Sánchez Altamirano in PASQUEL, 1971, t. II, p. 211.

tionary commitment, and the ouster of these officials constituted the most common item in revolutionary practice." Knight singles out Manuel López of Teocelo, who went from village to village deposing Porfirian authorities and naming Maderista municipal presidents from opposition groups, as a good example of this type of agrarian revolutionary. The local leaders, Gabriel Gavira, Rafael Tapia, and Pedro Carvajal, also fall into the same category. By the end of May 1911, rebels controlled eleven cantons and new authorities had been installed. What is still unclear, Knight admits, is whether these changes in local authorities brought real long-term transformation of the political power structure, for these rebel leaders after their first victories carried their cause down to the lowlands but headed west to Puebla and Tlaxcala where the Maderistas were encountering stiff resistance.[63] This is precisely what requires further exploration.

There is no question that a breakdown of local political authority occurred in the spring and summer of 1911. However, what is still open to question is what social groups took advantage of this power vacuum caused by the sudden collapse of the Porfirian state and the unwillingness or inability of Rafael Tapia, Gabriel Gavira and others to seize power. The few regional studies that span the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary period demonstrate that in the absence of a strong central or state government, local and regional power brokers, in most cases *rancheros*, emerged as key players in the Center, North, and the South. The *rancheros* seem to have stepped into this political space to protect the gains they had made during the Porfiriato. They were the ones who were able to exploit the clientage systems, land issues, ethnic discontent, and political chaos and in so doing reinforce or build their own *cacicazgos*.

David Skerritt first proposed the key role played by the *ranchero* in revolutionary and postrevolutionary period. The Center had experienced the flight of the *hacendados* to the cities, the increase in rural violence, and decimation of herds, rampant inflation, lack of work, and a rural population on the verge of starvation. With the disappearance of the

[63] KNIGHT, 1986, t. I, pp. 238-241, 360.

rurales by 1914, the *rancheros* gradually emerged as the guarantors of law and order in the countryside. *Hacendados* and prosperous *rancheros* were only too willing to pay them to protect their properties. These armed, mounted bands, or *guardias blancas*, often calling themselves Villistas or Zapatistas, roamed the countryside as local vigilantes. The arrival of the Carrancistas in the region did not improve the situation at all. On the contrary, the collective memory of the coastal inhabitants identified the Carrancistas as "*los malos*" and the *rancheros* as "*los buenos*". The notorious Gabay brothers and Rodolfo Herrera, who both raised their own armed bands, found it politically expedient to ally themselves with the anti-Carrancista rebels, Felix Díaz and Manuel Peláez.[64]

Velasco Toro's research on the South supports this argument by showing how *agrarismo* was not an important factor in Papaloapan. Rather it was the local *caciques*/medium-sized *rancheros* who rode into the breach left by the collapse of the Porfirian regime. He argues that banditry was engaged in not by agrarians but by prominent citizens to discourage rather than encourage widespread popular rebellion. The low population density and the lack of social cohesiveness among the small *rancheros*, who eked out their lives by farming out their labor, discouraged local agrarian unrest. Local disturbances only occurred around municipal seats, where local *caciques* wrested control of local governments away from urban elites. Darío González and Panuncio Martínez, the two local *caciques* in Cosamaloapan, feared the loss of their power and for this reason allied themselves with Orozquistas and then Zapatistas to retain what they had acquired during pre-revolutionary period. Thus these *ranchero*-led bands, rather than chipping away at the status quo as Knight suggests, were more interested in preserving and consolidating it.[65]

This same pattern takes slightly different forms in the North, but the overriding theme remains constant. Local *caciques* emerge and exploit the land issue and ethnic oppression for their own self-aggrandizement. Despite the social tensions that developed between the dispossessed for-

[64] SKERRITT GARDNER, 1989, pp. 156-163; HENDERSON, 1981.

[65] VELASCO TORO, 2003, pp. 356-360.

mer *comuneros* and the local elites, who had bought up most of their lots in the Sierra of Chicontepec, popular unrest did not emerge until 1912. In that year the Santa María Texcatepec Indians seized the lands that they claimed had been usurped during the Porfiriato. While Escobar and Gutiérrez link the land invasions directly to the Porfirian privatization practices,[66] the Nahuas, Totonacas, and Otomíes did not take up arms until a local mestizo *cacique*, José Guadalupe Osorio, and a survey engineer, Adalberto Tejeda Olivares, championed their cause. These two outside leaders exploited the ethnic dimension of the land conflicts by identifying themselves with the Indian community.[67]

Finally, the emergence of Manuel Peláez Gorrochótegui in the North best exemplifies the way in which *ranchero* leaders seized control of local and regional politics and fashioned new *cacicazgos* in the wake of the Maderista revolt. While Escobar, Gutiérrez, and Ducey link the losers, the disenfranchised former *comuneros*, to nineteenth century popular rebellion, Heather Fowler-Salamini, Alma Yolanda Guerrero Miller, and Glen Kuecker concentrate on the twentieth century winners, the *rancheros* of Tuxpan who used popular rebellion as a means to consolidate their *cacicazgos*.[68] Earlier studies have stressed how Manuel Peláez constructed a *cacicazgo* with horizontal ties to fellow *rancheros* in the region to win the lucrative rental contracts with the foreign oil companies. He also built strong clientelist ties with his contract workers. Exploiting the breakdown of political order in the Huasteca, he carved out for himself a unique *cacicazgo* that allowed him to enjoy considerable regional political and economic autonomy between 1912 and 1921, in large part because he was bankrolled by the oil companies.[69] Yolanda Guerrero Miller's fine study of the relationship between *cacicazgo* and the emergence of the revolutionary state conceptualizes the circular dependency between peripheral

[66] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GUTIÉRREZ, 1999, p. 228.

[67] ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE and GUTIÉRREZ, 1999, pp. 228-233. José Guadalupe Osorio created an image of himself as an "*indígena*", even though he came from a *mestizo* family. (Conversation with Antonio Escobar Ohmstede, 15 de junio de 2001). FALCÓN and GARCÍA MORALES, 1986, p. 55.

[68] GARCÍA DIEGO, 1981; FOWLER-SALAMINI, 1991; BROWN, 1993, pp. 264-270, 272-278.

[69] BROWN, 1993, pp. 264-270, 272-278; GARCÍA MORALES, 1989a, pp. 125-137.

caciques, their followers, and the central government. While the revolutionary state co-opted the *cacique*, to consolidate its power in much the same manner as the Porfirian regime had done, the *cacique* likewise manipulated the state to transform himself into a more modern form of power broker. Like any organism, the *cacicazgo* is therefore in a constant state of renovation.[70]

The Gorrochótegui-Pelaez *ranchero* mentality of the Huasteca shares much in common with Skerritt's *rancheros* of the Center in that control over access to land and labor resources was primordial. Most importantly these middle-sized freeholders desperately wanted to retain their economic gains and their political autonomy, while striving to distance themselves from their indigenous, *condueño* past. The Gorrochótegui-Peláez family, which owned properties both inside and outside the former *condueñazgo* of Temapache, became the key intermediary between three social groups: the *rancheros*, the oil companies, and the revolutionary state. Glen Kuecker traces the conflicts in the courts between the winners, the emerging *ranchero* elite, and the dispossessed *condueñazgo* members and how this conflict is related to local popular unrest. As municipal president of Temapache, Peláez found himself squarely in the middle of a *condueño-ranchero* dispute in 1912. When the Madero government tried to strip local authorities of the right to intervene in *repartos*, Peláez joined the Félix Díaz revolt. The *rancheros* legitimized their position as "the good citizens" in that they were protecting their claims to private land from state intervention. In the meantime, they characterized the former *condueños* and neighboring villagers as criminals and outcasts.[71]

Despite the devastating, hit-and-run attacks launched against Porfirian municipal authorities in the Maderista period, we find a remarkable amount of continuity between the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary period in the Veracruz countryside. Porfirian modernization programs that had spurred the development of a flourishing plantation economy and vibrant industrial and commercial sectors continued to function,

[70] GUERRERO MILLER, 1991, pp. 23-25, 73-93, 98-105.

[71] KUECKER, 1994, pp. 28-32.

albeit at a reduced level. The cash crop economy was able to prosper during the 1910s primarily because the international price of sugar and coffee remained quite high and Veracruzanos had access to the nation's major port. What is more, the absence of bitter civil war, which plagued other parts of the republic, allowed business to keep more rural and urban workers employed. The division of agricultural properties continued, albeit at a slower pace, as medium and large landowners remained actively involved in the land market and cattle-raising. The alliances forged between *hacendados* and *rancheros* allowed the rural elites to maintain their domination of the land and labor market.[72]

Final Considerations

New historiographical approaches, innovative methodologies, and untapped archival sources have inspired scholars to challenge some of the basic tenets of the official, populist Veracruz historiography as they relate to land tenure, the Indian question, and popular agrarian unrest in the nmineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Path-breaking long-term studies drawing on the *Annaliste* school demonstrate that *haciendas*, *ranchos*, and communal land tenure patterns were not at all stagnant agrarian institutions, but they were intricately interconnected and were in the process of continual transformation throughout this period particularly in the Center. The land tenure patterns were much more diverse and malleable than has previously been assumed. Moreover, the modernization process was forcing the hacienda system to become more efficient by pressuring owners to accumulate higher debts, break up their holdings into smaller units, and sell them off to Mexican and foreign investors. This phenomenon in large part contributed to the emergence of thousands of small- and medium-sized-ranchos. At the same time population pressures, particularly in the coffee-producing central highlands, led to the breakup of smaller units into *minifundios*. Unfortunately we know

[72] Rodríguez Centeno, 1997, pp. 238-249; Skerritt Gardner, 1989, pp. 97-100; León Fuentes, 1983; Beaumond, 1988, pp. 117-119.

much less about the flourishing plantation system that produced sugar for the domestic market and tobacco, lumber, and fruits primarily for the export market.

The new literature on all three regions has shown conclusively that the state's Liberal project was not the only motor for the privatization of communal lands. Strong evidence suggests that local events and competing social groups played critical roles, just as in Central Mexico, in the division of these properties. What is in dispute is what were the short- and long-term objectives of the peasants, *rancheros*, and merchants, who obstructed, resisted, and/or manipulated the process. While some scholars have stressed the populist nature of the *condueñazgos*, which *comuneros* created to maintain control and gain access to their resources, others have maintained this transitional institution was simply manipulated by individual members of the local elite for their own personal aggrandizement. Is this more about peasant agency or the emergence of a rural middle class, the *rancheros*? Thus the consequences of nineteenth-century peasant agency are very much still in dispute.

The seminal contributions on the emergence of Veracruz *ranchero* society and culture in the Center have now been complemented by work on the Huasteca ranchero. It is becoming increasingly evident that members of this particular social group were the primary beneficiaries of the privatization process, the breakup of the *hacienda* system, and the exploitation of under-utilized lands. In sum, by the first decade of the twentieth century *rancheros* were beginning to consolidate their economic and political power particularly in the North and the Center. As the *hacienda* owners were forced to modernize their holdings or face extinction they were gradually ceding not only economic wealth but also political and social power to this emerging rural middle class. *Caciquismo* rather than dying out with the Revolution re-emerged stronger than ever, although it took a number of different modern forms.

While we now know that these *rancheros* were the principal beneficiaries of Porfirian agricultural policies, as in other parts of the republic, we do not yet have sufficient information to know why some joined the revolution, while others did not. *Rancheros* acted sort of as swingmen when the Maderista movement erupted in Veracruz. The Aguilars, Gabays,

Alemáns joined the revolt in the spring of 1911 believing that the overthrow of Díaz would allow them to increase their economic and political influence *vis à vis* the larger landowning elites, who had supported Govenor Teodoro Dehesa. They integrated themselves into the revolutionary armies to gain some of the spoils. In fact, all of these three *ranchero* families profited handsomely from the Revolution. On the other side of the political spectrum, were the Pelaezes, Panuncio Martínez, and later Manuel Parra, who hung back, switched back and forth from one side to the other, or openly collaborated with landowners. They came to view the policies of the revolutionary state as inimical to the gains that they had made before the outbreak of the revolution. Choosing to become "social" bandits, they armed *guardias blancas* and created their own system of law and order in the countryside. In so doing, they challenged, the revolutionary and modernizing tendencies of maderismo, carrancismo, and the *sonorenses*.

These recent findings have therefore cast doubt on the populists' emphasis on the importance of the Totonac and Popolucan revolts as precursory movements to the 1910 Revolution. The Indians' struggle for the restoration of communal lands cannot be dismissed as one of the contributing causes to armed popular unrest in the early days of Mexican Revolution. In some regions, such as Chicontepec, where the indigenous population predominated, it played a key role. However, throughout the rest of the state, the indigenous population did not play a significant part in spontaneous armed rebellions of the Maderista period or for that matter over the course of the next decade. They tended to be followers rather than leaders, who were persuaded to join the Revolution by outside *mestizo* leaders, who began to woo them to build up their own political/military bases. *Mestizo rancheros* and/or *caciques* rather than *indígenas* and/or *comuneros* seized the initiative to occupy the political spaces left void by the collapse of the Porfirian regime.

Finally, the lack of serious agrarian discontent in Veracruz explains in good part the relative quiescence in the countryside, in contrast to the bordering states of Puebla and Tlaxcala. What is more, no charismatic leader emerged to lead the Maderista cause, for Primo Tapia, Gabriel Gavira, Heriberto Jara, or Cándido Aguilar never gained sufficient wide-

spread popular support in the early days of the Revolution to win election or seize control of the state apparatus. The landowning and commercial elite still exercised sufficient influence to control the governorship until the Carrancista armies marched into the state in 1914. Continuity rather than rupture reigned in the countryside, despite the breakdown of law and order. The real change in the rural power structure would occur only after the defeat of the Delahuertistas in December 1923, when a survey engineer turned urban politician allied himself with rural *caciques* and agrarians to carry out the first systematic distribution of landholdings throughout the state of Veracruz.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA

AGETRO, Leafar
1942 *Las luchas proletarias en Veracruz: historia y autocrítica*, COCM, Jalapa.

AGUIRRE TINOCO, Humberto
1988 *Tenoya. Crónica de la revolución en Tlacotalpan*, Universidad Veracruzana, Xalapa.

AZAOLA GARRIDO, Elena
1982 *Rebelión y derrota del magonismo agrario*, col. SEP/80, no. 17, SEP/FCE, Mexico.

BARRAGÁN, Esteban
1990 *Más allá de los caminos*, El Colegio de Michoacán, Zamora.

BEAUMOND, Anne
1988 *Elite et changement social: L'histoire du groupe de Xalapa en la cafeiculture mexicaine, 1880-1997*, These presenté a l'Ecole Nacionale Superieure Agronomique de Montpellier.

BAITENMANN, Helga
1998 "Rural Agency and State Formation in Postrevolutionary Mexico: The Agrarian Reform in Central Veracruz (1915-1992)", unpub. manuscript.

BLÁZQUEZ DOMÍNGUEZ, Carmen
2000 *Breve historia de Veracruz*, serie Breves Historias de los Estados de la República Mexicana, El Colegio de México/FCE/Fideicomiso Historia de las Américas, Mexico.

BROWN, Jonathan C.
1993 *Oil and Revolution*, University of California Press, Berkeley.

BUVE, Raymond
1994 "Agricultores, dominación política y estructura agraria en la Revolución Mexicana: el caso de Tlaxcala (1910-1981)", in *El movimiento revolucionario en Tlaxcala*, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico, pp. 217-276.

CAMBREZY, Luc and Bernal LASCURAIN
1991 *Crónicas de un territorio fraccionado. De la hacienda al ejido (Centro de Veracruz)*, Larousse/ORSTOM/CIESAS, Mexico.

CHENAUT, Victoria (coord.)
1996 "Fin de siglo en la costa totonaca: rebeliones indias y violencia regional, 1891-1896," in *Procesos rurales e historia regional (Sierra y costa totonaca de Veracruz)*, SEP/CIESAS, Mexico, pp. 75-101.

CÓRDOVA, Arnaldo
1977 *La ideología de la Revolución*, Era, Mexico.
2001 *State Fixations, Fugitive Landscapes: Mapping, Surveying and the Spatial Creation of Modern Mexico, 1850-1930*, Ph. D. Diss., Yale University.
2002 "A Nationalist Metaphysics: State Fixations, National Maps, and the Geo-Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Mexico", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, February, 82: 1.

COCKCROFT, James
1968 *Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913*, University of Texas Press, Austin.

CORZO, Ricardo *et al.*
1986 *"... nunca un desleal": Cándido Aguilar*, El Colegio de México/Universidad Veracruzana, Mexico.

CRAIB, Raymond B.
2001 "State Fixations, Fugitive Landscapes: Mapping, Surveying and the Spatial Creation of Modern Mexico, 1850-1930", Ph .D. Diss, Yale University.
2002 "A Nationalist Metaphysics: State Fixations, National Maps and the Geo-Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Mexico", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, February, 82:1.

DUCEY, Michael
1997 "Liberal Theory and Peasant Practice: Land and Power in Northern Veracruz, Mexico, 1826-1900", in Robert H. Jackson (ed.), *Liberals, the Church, and Indian Peasants*, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.
2002 "Indios liberales y liberales indigenistas. Ideología y poder en los municipios rurales de Veracruz, 1821-1890", in Antonio Escobar

Ohmstede and Luz Carregha (coords.), *El siglo XIX en las Huastecas*, CIESAS/El Colegio de San Luis Potosí, Mexico, pp. 111-136.

ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE, Antonio and Jaqueline GORDILLO

1998 "¿Defensa o despojo? Territorialidad indígena en las Huastecas, 1856-1930", *Estudios campesinos en el Archivo General Agrario*, t. II, CIESAS/RAN, Mexico.

ESCOBAR OHMSTEDE, Antonio and Ana María GUTIÉRREZ

1999 "Dos momentos del proceso agrario: el caso de Chicontepec, 1870-1930", *Estudios campesinos en el Archivo General Agrario*, t. II, Registro Agrario Nacional/CIESAS, Mexico.

FALCÓN, Romana

1984 *Revolución y caciquismo. San Luis Potosí, 1910-1938*, El Colegio de México, Mexico.

FALCÓN, Romana and Soledad GARCÍA MORALES

1986 *La semilla en el surco. Adalberto Tejeda y el radicalismo en Veracruz, 1883-1960*, El Colegio de México/Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, Mexico.

FOWLER-SALAMINI, Heather

1991 "Caciquismo and the Mexican Revolution. The Case of Manuel Peláez", in Roderic A. Camp, Charles Hale, and Josefina Vázquez (eds.), *Intellectuals and Power in México*, El Colegio de México/UCLA, Los Angeles, pp. 189-209.

FOWLER-SALAMINI, Heather

1993 "Revuelta popular y regionalismo en Veracruz, 1906-1913", *Eslabones*, Mexico, enero-junio, no. 5.

1994 "Gender, Work, and Coffee in Córdoba, Veracruz, 1850-1910", in Heather Fowler-Salamini and Mary Kay Vaughan (eds.), *Women of the Mexican Countryside, 1850-1990*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, pp. 51-73.

GARCÍA DIEGO, Javier

1981 "Revolución constitucionalista y contrarrevolución: movimientos reaccionarios en México, 1914-1920", Ph. D Diss., El Colegio de México, Mexico.

GARCÍA MORALES, Soledad

1989a "Análisis de la estadística de 1907. Haciendas y hacendados", Mirna Benítez *et al.*, *Veracruz, un tiempo para contar*, INAH/Universidad Veracruzana, Mexico, pp. 131-179.

1989b "Manuel Peláez y Guadalupe Sánchez: dos caciques regionales", *La Palabra y el Hombre*, enero-marzo, no. 69, pp. 125-136.

GONZÁLEZ DE LA LAMA, Renée Lilian
1990a "Rebels and Bandits: Popular Discontent and Liberal Modernization in Nineteenth Century Veracruz", Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago.
1990b "Revueltas populares y gavillas en Veracruz: 1867-1905", *La Palabra y el Hombre*, Universidad Veracruzana, enero-marzo, no. 69, pp. 53-73.
GONZÁLEZ Y GONZÁLEZ, Luis
1974 *San José de Gracia. Mexican Village in Transition*, University of Texas, Austin.
GUERRA, François-Xavier
1985 *México: del Antiguo Régimen a la Revolución*, FCE, Mexico, 2 ts.
GUERRERO MILLER, Alma Yolanda
1991 *Cuesta abajo. Declinación de tres caciques huastecos revolucionarios: Cedillo, Santos y Peláez*, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Universidad Autónoma de Tamaulipas, Ciudad Victoria.
HEWITT DE ALCÁNTARA, Cynthia
1984 *Anthroplogical Perspectives on Rural Mexico*, Routledge, Kegan and Paul, London.
HOFFMANN, Odile
1992 *Tierras y territorio en Xico, Veracruz*, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, Xalapa.
HOFFMANN, Odile and David SKERRITT GARDNER
1992 "Enquete sur une figure peu connue du monde rural: le ranchero du Mexique", *Cahiers Sciences Humaines*, 28: 4, pp. 665-684.
HENDERSON, Peter
1981 *Félix Díaz, the Porfirians and the Mexican Revolution*, University Nebraska Press, Lincoln.
JACOBS, Ian
1982 *Ranchero Revolt. The Mexican Revolution in Guerrero*, University of Texas Press, Austin.
JOSEPHT, Gilbert M.
1996 *Summer of Discontent, Seasons of Upheaval*, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
KATZ, Friedrich (ed.)
1988 *Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution. Rural Social Conflict in Mexico*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
KATZ, Friedrich
1998 *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, California.

KNIGHT, Alan

1985 "The Mexican Revolution: Bourgeois? Nationalist? Or Just a 'Great Revolution'?", in *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 4: 2.

1986 *The Mexican Revolution*, t. I, Cambridge University Press [Re-print University of Nebraska Press], Lincoln and London.

KOTH, Karl

2002 *Waking the Dictator: Veracruz, the Struggle for Federalism, and the Mexican Revolution, 1870-1927*, University of Calgary Press, Calgary.

KOURI, Emilio

1996 *The Business of Land: Agrarian Tenure and Enterprise in Papantla, Mexico, 1800-1910*, Ph. D. Diss., Harvard University.

2002 "Interpreting the Expropriation of Indian Pueblo Lands in Porfirian Mexico: the Unexamined Legacies of Andrés Molina Enríquez", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, February, 82: 1, pp. 69-117.

forthcoming *The Business of the Land*, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

KUECKER, Glen David

1994 "Land, Oil and the Transformation of Space in the Formation of Regional Identity in Northeastern, Veracruz", Paper presented at the Canadian Historical Association Annual Meeting of Learned Societies, June 13.

LEÓN FUENTES, Nelly

1983 *Conformación de un capital en torno a la cafeticultura en la región de Xalapa-Coatepec: 1890-1940*, tesis de Maestría en Historia, Universidad Veracruzana, Xalapa.

LLOYD, Jane-Dale

1987 *El proceso de modernización capitalista en el noroeste de Chihuahua (1890-1910)*, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico.

MALLON, Florencia E.

1994 "The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American History", *American Historical Review*, December, 99:5.

1995 *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru*, University of California Press, Berkeley, California.

MEYER, Jean A.

1973a *La révolution mexicaine*, Paris, Calmann.

1973b *Problemas campesinos y revueltas agrarias (1821-1910)*, col. SEP/70, no. 80, SEP, Mexico.

MEYER, Lorenzo
1977 "Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State", in José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert (eds.), *Authoritarianism in Mexico*, Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia.

PADUA, Cándido Donato
1936 *Movimiento revolucionario-1906 en Veracruz*, Tlalpan, D.F.

PASQUEL, Leonardo
1971 *La revolución en el estado de Veracruz*, Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, Mexico, 2 ts.

PREVÔT SCHAPIRA, Marie France
1994 "El Sur de Veracruz en el siglo XIX: Una modernización 'a marcha forzada,'", in Odile Hoffmann and Emilia Velázquez (coords.), *Las llanuras costeras de Veracruz*, Universidad Veracruzana/ORSTOM, Xalapa, pp. 245-277.

REINA, Leticia
1980 *Las rebeliones campesinas en México (1819-1906)*, Siglo XXI, Mexico.

RENDÓN GARCINI, Ricardo
1993 *El Prosperato. Tlaxcala de 1885 a 1911*, UIA/Siglo XXI, Mexico.

RODRÍGUEZ CENTENO, Mabel M.
1997 *Paisaje agrario y sociedad rural. Tenencia de la tierra y caficultura en Córdoba, Veracruz, 1870-1940*, Ph.D. Diss., El Colegio de México, Mexico.

SARTORIUS, Carl C.
1870 "Memoria sobre el estado de la agricultura en el Partido de Huatusco," *Boletín de la Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística*, no. 2.

SCOTT, James C.
1985 *The Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant* Resistance, Yale University Press, New Haven.

SCHRYER, Frans J.
1980 *The Rancheros of Pisaflores. The History of a Peasant Bourgeoise in Twentieth Century Mexico*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

SKERRITT GARDNER, David
1989 *Una historia agraria en el centro de Veracruz, 1850-1940*, Universidad Veracruzana, Xalapa.
1993 *Rancheros sobre tierra fértil*, Universidad Veracruzana, Xalapa.
1994 "El ranchero: génesis y consolidación", Esteban Barragán López *et al.* (coords.), *Rancheros y sociedades rurales*, El Colegio de Michoacán, CEMCA/ORSTOM, Zamora, pp. 141-152.
1996 *Peasant Organization in the State of Veracruz, 1920 to the Present*, D. Phil., Oxford, chap. 1.

TRENS, Manuel B.
1988 "Sotavento, los primeros brotes revolucionarios", in Carmen Blázquez Domínquez (comp.), *Veracruz. Textos de su historia*, t. II, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, Xalapa.

THOMSON, Guy P. C.
1991 "Agrarian conflict in the Municipality of Cuetzalan (Sierra de Puebla): The Rise and Fall of 'Palo' Agustin Dieguillo", *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May, 71:2, pp. 205-258.

VELASCO TORO, José
1979 "Indigenismo y rebelión totonaca en Papantla, 1885-1896", *América Indígena*, XXXIX: 1, pp. 81-105.
2001 "La lucha por la tierra y el poder político en Chacaltianguis, Veracruz", *Vetas*, mayo-agosto, 3: 8, pp. 11-35.
2003 *Tierra y conflicto social en los pueblos del Papaloapan veracruzano (1521-1917)*, col. Biblioteca, Universidad Veracruzana, Xalapa.

VELÁZQUEZ, Emilia H.
1992 "Reforma agraria y cambio social entre los nahuas de Mecajapan," in Olivia Domínguez Pérez (coord.), *Agrarismo y agraristas*, Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, Xalapa.
1995 *Cuando los arrieros perdieron sus caminos*, El Colegio de Michoacán, Zamora.

WELLS, Allen and Gilbert M. JOSEPH
1996 *Summer of Discontent. Elite Politics and Rural Insurgency, 1876-1915*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, California.

WOMACK, John
1991 "The Mexican Revolution, 1910-20," in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Mexico since Independence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.